This document specifies the Security Evaluated Standardized Password Authenticated Key Exchange (SESPAKE) protocol. The SESPAKE protocol provides password authenticated key exchange for usage in the systems for protection of sensitive information. The security proofs of the protocol were made for the case of an active adversary in the channel, including MitM attacks and attacks based on the impersonation of one of the subjects.
Initial Values of the Protocol Counters
After the setup of a new password value PW the values of the counters MUST be assigned as follows: C_1^A = C_1^B = CLim_1, where CLim_1 is in {3,,5}; C_2^A = C_2^B = CLim_2, where CLim_2 is in {7,,20}; C_3^A = C_3^B = CLim_3, where CLim_3 is in {10^3,10^3+1,,10^5}.
Protocol Steps
The basic SESPAKE steps are shown in the scheme below: 
A [A_ID, PW] B [B_ID, Q_PW , ind, salt]
The full description of the protocol consists of the following steps:
1. If any of the counters C_1^A, C_2^A, C_3^A is equal to 0, A finishes the protocol with an error that informs of exceeding the number of trials that is controlled by the corresponding counter. 2. A decrements each of the counters C_1^A, C_2^A, C_3^A by 1, requests open authentication information from B and sends the ID_A identifier. 3. If any of the counters C_1^B, C_2^B, C_3^B is equal to 0, B finishes the protocol with an error that informs of exceeding the number of trials that is controlled by the corresponding counter. 4. B decrements each of the counters C_1^B, C_2^B, C_3^B by 1. 5. B sends the values of ind, salt and the ID_ALG identifier to A. B also can OPTIONALLY send the ID_B identifier to A. All following calculations are done by B in the elliptic curve group defined by the ID_ALG identifier. 6. A sets the curve defined by the received ID_ALG identifier as the used elliptic curve. All following calculations are done by A in this elliptic curve group. 7. A calculates the point Q_PW^A = int (F (PW, salt, 2000) )*Q_ind. 8. A chooses randomly (according to the uniform distribution) the value alpha, alpha is in {1, ,q-1}, and assigns z_A = 0. 9. A sends the value u_1 = alpha*P -Q_PW^A to B. 10. After receiving u_1, B checks that u_1 is in E. If it is not, B finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful. 11. B calculates Q_B = u_1 + Q_PW, assigns z_B = 0 and chooses randomly (according to the uniform distribution) the value betta, betta is in {1,,q-1}. 12. If m/q*Q_B = O, B assigns Q_B = betta*P and z_B = 1. 13. B calculates K_B = HASH (BYTES(( m/q*betta*(mod q))*Q_B )). 14. B sends the value u_2 = betta*P + Q_PW to A. 15. After receiving u_2, A checks that u_2 is in E. If it is not, A finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful. 16. A calculates Q_A = u_2 -Q_PW^A. 17. If m/q*Q_A = O, then A assigns Q_A = alpha*P and z_A = 1. 18. A calculates K_A = HASH (BYTES(( m/q*alpha(mod q))*Q_A )). 19. A calculates U_1 = BYTES(u_1), U_2 = BYTES(u_2). 20. A calculates MAC_A = HMAC (K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || ind || salt || U_1 || U_2 || ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) || DATA_A), where DATA_A is an OPTIONAL string that is authenticated with MAC_A (if it is not used, then DATA_A is considered to be of zero length). 21. A sends DATA_A, MAC_A to B. 22. B calculates U_1 = BYTES(u_1), U_2 = BYTES(u_2). 23. B checks that the values MAC_A and HMAC (K_B, 0x01 || ID_A || ind || salt || U_1 || U_2 || ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) || DATA_A) are equal. If they are not, it finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful. 24. If z_B = 1, B finishes, considering the authentication process unsuccessful. 25. B sets the value of C_1^B to CLim_1 and increments C_2^B by 1. 26. B calculates MAC_B = HMAC(K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || ind || salt || U_1 || U_2 || ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) || DATA_A || DATA_B), where DATA_B is an OPTIONAL string that is authenticated with MAC_B (if it is not used, then DATA_B is considered to be of zero length). 27. B sends DATA_B, MAC_B to A. 28. A checks that the values MAC_B and HMAC (K_A, 0x02 || ID_B || ind || salt || U_1 || U_2 || ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) || DATA_A || DATA_B) are equal. If they are not, it finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful. 29. If z_A = 1, A finishes, considering the authentication process unsuccessful. 30. A sets the value of C_1^A to CLim_1 and increments C_2^A by 1.
After the successful finish of the procedure the subjects A and B are mutually authenticated and each subject has an explicitly authenticated value of K = K_A = K_B. N o t e s :
1. In the case when the interaction process can be initiated by any subject (client or server) the ID_A and ID_B options MUST be used and the receiver MUST check that the identifier he had received is not equal to his own, otherwise, it finishes the protocol. If an OPTIONAL parameter ID_A (or ID_B) is not used in the protocol, it SHOULD be considered equal to a fixed byte string (zero-length string is allowed) defined by a specific implementation. 2. The ind, ID_A, ID_B and salt parameters can be agreed in advance. If some parameter is agreed in advance, it is possible not to send it during a corresponding step. Nevertheless, all parameters MUST be used as corresponding inputs to HMAC function during stages 20, 23, 26 and 28. 3. The ID_ALG parameter can be fixed or agreed in advance. 4. The ID_ALG parameter is RECOMMENDED to be used in HMAC during stages 20, 23, 26 and 28. 5. Continuation of protocol interaction in case of any of the counters C_1^A, C_1^B being equal to zero MAY be done without changing password. In this case these counters can be used for protection against denial-of-service attacks. For example, continuation of interaction can be allowed after a certain delay. 6. Continuation of protocol interaction in case of any of the counters C_2^A, C_3^A, C_2^B, C_3^B being equal to zero MUST be done only after changing password. 7. It is RECOMMENDED that during the stages 9 and 14 the points u_1 and u_2 are sent in a non-compressed format (BYTES(u_1) and BYTES(u_2)). However, the point compression MAY be used. 8. The use of several Q points can reinforce the independence of the data streams in case of working with several applications, when, for example, two high-level protocols can use two different points. However, the use of more than one point is OPTIONAL.
Construction of Points Q_1,...,Q_N
This section provides an example of possible algorithm for generation of each point Q_i in the set {Q_1,...,Q_N} that corresponds to the given elliptic curve E.
The algorithm is based on choosing points with coordinates with a known preimages of a cryptographic hash function H, which is the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [RFC6986] ) with 256-bit output, if 2^254 < q < 2^256, and the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [RFC6986] ) with 512-bit output , if 2^508 < q < 2^512.
The algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Set i = 1, SEED = 0, s = 4 or more. 2. Calculate X = int(HASH(BYTES(P)||bytes_s(SEED))) mod p. 3. Check that the value of X^3 + aX + b is a quadratic residue in the field F_p. If it is not, set SEED = SEED + 1 and return to Step 2. 4. Choose the value of Y = min{r1, r2}, where r1, r2 from {0,1,...,p-1} such that r1 != r2 and r1^2 = r2^2 = R mod p for R = X^3 + aX + b. 5. Check that for point Q = (X,Y) the following relations hold: Q != O and q*Q = O. If they do, go to
Step 6, if not, set SEED = SEED + 1 and return to Step 2.
6. Set Q_i = Q. If i < N, then set i = i+1 and go to Step 2, else FINISH.
With the defined algorithm for any elliptic curve E point sets {Q_1,...,Q_N} are constructed. Constructed points in one set MUST have distinct X-coordinates.
N o t e : The knowledge of a hash function preimage prevents knowledge of the multiplicity of any point related to generator point P. It is of primary importance, because such a knowledge could be used to implement an attack against protocol with exhaustive search of password.
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Security Considerations
Any cryptographic algorithms, particularly HASH function and HMAC function, that are used in the SESPAKE protocol MUST be carefully designed and MUST be able to withstand all known types of cryptanalytic attack.
It is RECOMMENDED that the HASH function satisfies the following condition: hashlen <= log_2(q) + 4, where hashlen is the lengths of the HASH function output.
The output length of hash functions that are used in the SESPAKE protocol is RECOMMENDED to be greater or equal to 256 bits.
The points Q_1, Q_2,...,Q_N and P MUST be chosen in such a way that they are provable pseudorandom. As a practical matter, this means that the algorithm for generation of each point Q_i in the set {Q_1,...,Q_N} (see Section 5) ensures that multiplicity of any point under any other point is unknown.
For a certain ID_ALG using N = 1 is RECOMMENDED.
N o t e: The exact adversary models, which have been considered during the security evaluation, can be found in the paper [SESPAKE-SECURITY] , containing the security proofs. [RFC7091] Dolmatov, V. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012: Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091, DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V., Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V. 
Appendix A. Test Examples for GOST-based Protocol Implementation
The following test examples are made for the protocol implementation that is based on the Russian national standards GOST R 34.10-2012 [GOST3410-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 [GOST3411-2012 
A.1. Examples of Points
There is one point Q_1 for each of the elliptic curves below. This points were constructed using the method described in Section 5, in case when N = 1, where the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [RFC6986] ) with 256-bit output is used if 2^254 < q < 2^256, the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [RFC6986] ) with 512-bit output is used if 2^508 < q < 2^512.
Each of the points complies with the GOST R 34. 10-2012 10- [GOST3410-2012 standard and is represented by a pair of (X, Y) coordinates in the canonical form and by a pair of (U, V) coordinates in the twisted Edwards form in accordance with the document [RFC7836] for the curves that have the equivalent representation in this form. There is a SEED value for each point, by which it was generated. The coordinates of the point Q_PW are: X = 0x59495655D1E7C7424C622485F575CCF121F3122D274101E8AB734CC9C9A9B45E Y = 0x48D1C311D33C9B701F3B03618562A4A07A044E3AF31E3999E67B487778B53C62 During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values: alpha=0x1F2538097D5A031FA68BBB43C84D12B3DE47B7061C0D5E24993E0C873CDBA6B3 alpha*P: X = 0xBBC77CF42DC1E62D06227935379B4AA4D14FEA4F565DDF4CB4FA4D31579F9676 Y = 0x8E16604A4AFDF28246684D4996274781F6CB80ABBBA1414C1513EC988509DABF u_1: X = 0x204F564383B2A76081B907F3FCA8795E806BE2C2ED228730B5B9E37074229E8D Y = 0xE84F9E442C61DDE37B601A7F37E7CA11C56183FA071DFA9320EDE3E7521F9D41 During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take the following values: betta=0xDC497D9EF6324912FD367840EE509A2032AEDB1C0A890D133B45F596FCCBD45D src:
A.2. Test Examples of SESPAKE
2E 01 
During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values: alpha=0x499D72B90299CAB0DA1F8BE19D9122F622A13B32B730C46BD0664044F2144FAD alpha*P: X = 0x61D6F916DB717222D74877F179F7EBEF7CD4D24D8C1F523C048E34A1DF30F8DD Y = 0x3EC48863049CFCFE662904082E78503F4973A4E105E2F1B18C69A5E7FB209000 u_1: X = 0x21F5437AF33D2A1171A070226B4AE82D3765CD0EEBFF1ECEFE158EBC50C63AB1 Y = 0x5C9553B5D11AAAECE738AD9A9F8CB4C100AD4FA5E089D3CBCCEA8C0172EB7ECC During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take The coordinates of the point Q_PW are: X = 0x945821DAF91E158B839939630655A3B21FF3E146D27041E86C05650EB3B46B59 Y = 0x3A0C2816AC97421FA0E879605F17F0C9C3EB734CFF196937F6284438D70BDC48 During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values: alpha=0x3A54AC3F19AD9D0B1EAC8ACDCEA70E581F1DAC33D13FEAFD81E762378639C1A8 alpha*P: X = 0x96B7F09C94D297C257A7DA48364C0076E59E48D221CBA604AE111CA3933B446A Y = 0x54E4953D86B77ECCEB578500931E822300F7E091F79592CA202A020D762C34A6 u_1: X = 0x81BBD6FCA464D2E2404A66D786CE4A777E739A89AEB68C2DAC99D53273B75387 Y = 0x6B6DBD922EA7E060998F8B230AB6EF07AD2EC86B2BF66391D82A30612EADD411 During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take the following values: betta=0x448781782BF7C0E52A1DD9E6758FD3482D90D3CFCCF42232CF357E59A4D49FD4 src:
16 The coordinates of the point Q_PW are: X = 0x7D03E65B8050D1E12CBB601A17B9273B0E728F5021CD47C8A4DD822E4627BA5F 9C696286A2CDDA9A065509866B4DEDEDC4A118409604AD549F87A60AFA621161 Y = 0x16037DAD45421EC50B00D50BDC6AC3B85348BC1D3A2F85DB27C3373580FEF87C 2C743B7ED30F22BE22958044E716F93A61CA3213A361A2797A16A3AE62957377 During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values: alpha=0x715E893FA639BF341296E0623E6D29DADF26B163C278767A7982A989462A3863 FE12AEF8BD403D59C4DC4720570D4163DB0805C7C10C4E818F9CB785B04B9997 alpha*P: X = 0x10C479EA1C04D3C2C02B0576A9C42D96226FF033C1191436777F66916030D87D 02FB93738ED7669D07619FFCE7C1F3C4DB5E5DF49E2186D6FA1E2EB5767602B9 Y = 0x039F6044191404E707F26D59D979136A831CCE43E1C5F0600D1DDF8F39D0CA3D 52FBD943BF04DDCED1AA2CE8F5EBD7487ACDEF239C07D015084D796784F35436 u_1: X = 0x45C05CCE8290762F2470B719B4306D62B2911CEB144F7F72EF11D10498C7E921 FF163FE72044B4E7332AD8CBEC3C12117820F53A60762315BCEB5BC6DA5CF1E0 Y = 0x5BE483E382D0F5F0748C4F6A5045D99E62755B5ACC9554EC4A5B2093E121A2DD 5C6066BC9EDE39373BA19899208BB419E38B39BBDEDEB0B09A5CAAEAA984D02E During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take The coordinates of the point Q_PW are: X = 0xDBF99827078956812FA48C6E695DF589DEF1D18A2D4D35A96D75BF6854237629 Y = 0x9FDDD48BFBC57BEE1DA0CFF282884F284D471B388893C48F5ECB02FC18D67589 During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values: alpha=0x147B72F6684FB8FD1B418A899F7DBECAF5FCE60B13685BAA95328654A7F0707F alpha*P: X = 0x33FBAC14EAE538275A769417829C431BD9FA622B6F02427EF55BD60EE6BC2888 Y = 0x22F2EBCF960A82E6CDB4042D3DDDA511B2FBA925383C2273D952EA2D406EAE46 u_1: X = 0xE569AB544E3A13C41077DE97D659A1B7A13F61DDD808B633A5621FE2583A2C43 Y = 0xA21A743A08F4D715661297ECD6F86553A808925BF34802BF7EC34C548A40B2C0 During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take The coordinates of the point Q_PW are: X = 0x0185AE6271A81BB7F236A955F7CAA26FB63849813C0287D96C83A15AE6B6A864 67AB13B6D88CE8CD7DC2E5B97FF5F28FAC2C108F2A3CF3DB5515C9E6D7D210E8 Y = 0xED0220F92EF771A71C64ECC77986DB7C03D37B3E2AB3E83F32CE5E074A762EC0 8253C9E2102B87532661275C4B1D16D2789CDABC58ACFDF7318DE70AB64F09B8 During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values: alpha=0x332F930421D14CFE260042159F18E49FD5A54167E94108AD80B1DE60B13DE799 9A34D611E63F3F870E5110247DF8EC7466E648ACF385E52CCB889ABF491EDFF0 alpha*P: X = 0x561655966D52952E805574F4281F1ED3A2D498932B00CBA9DECB42837F09835B FFBFE2D84D6B6B242FE7B57F92E1A6F2413E12DDD6383E4437E13D72693469AD Y = 0xF6B18328B2715BD7F4178615273A36135BC0BF62F7D8BB9F080164AD36470AD0 3660F51806C64C6691BADEF30F793720F8E3FEAED631D6A54A4C372DCBF80E82 u_1: X = 0x40645B4B9A908D74DEF98886A336F98BAE6ADA4C1AC9B7594A33D5E4A16486C5 533C7F3C5DD84797AB5B4340BFC70CAF1011B69A01A715E5B9B5432D5151CBD7 Y = 0x267FBB18D0B79559D1875909F2A15F7B49ECD8ED166CF7F4FCD1F44891550483 5E80D52BE8D34ADA5B5E159CF52979B1BCFE8F5048DC443A0983AA19192B8407 During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take the following values: betta=0x38481771E7D054F96212686B613881880BD8A6C89DDBC656178F014D2C093432 A033EE10415F13A160D44C2AD61E6E2E05A7F7EC286BCEA3EA4D4D53F8634FA2 src:
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Appendix B. Point Verification Script
The points from the Appendix A.1 were generated with the following point verification script that is written in Python: curvesParams = [ { "OID":"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "p":0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFD97, "a":0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFD94, "b":166, "m":0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF6C611070995AD10045841B09B761B893, "q":0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF6C611070995AD10045841B09B761B893, "x":1, "y":0x8D91E471E0989CDA27DF505A453F2B7635294F2DDF23E3B122ACC99C9E9F1E14, "n":32 }, { "OID":"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "p":0x8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000C99, "a":0x8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000C96, "b":0x3E1AF419A269A5F866A7D3C25C3DF80AE979259373FF2B182F49D4CE7E1BBC8B, "m":0x800000000000000000000000000000015F700CFFF1A624E5E497161BCC8A198F, "q":0x800000000000000000000000000000015F700CFFF1A624E5E497161BCC8A198F, "x":1, "y":0x3FA8124359F96680B83D1C3EB2C070E5C545C9858D03ECFB744BF8D717717EFC, "n":32 }, { "OID":"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "p":0x9B9F605F5A858107AB1EC85E6B41C8AACF846E86789051D37998F7B9022D759B, "a":0x9B9F605F5A858107AB1EC85E6B41C8AACF846E86789051D37998F7B9022D7598, "b":32858, "m":0x9B9F605F5A858107AB1EC85E6B41C8AA582CA3511EDDFB74F02F3A6598980BB9, "q":0x9B9F605F5A858107AB1EC85E6B41C8AA582CA3511EDDFB74F02F3A6598980BB9, "x":0, "y":0x41ECE55743711A8C3CBF3783CD08C0EE4D4DC440D4641A8F366E550DFDB3BB67, "n":32 }, { "OID":"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA", "p":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\ (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<80)+\ 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDC7L, "a":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\ (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<80)+\ 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDC4L, "b":(0xE8C2505DEDFC86DDC1BD0B2B6667F1DA34B82574761CB0E879BD08L<<296)+\ (0x1CFD0B6265EE3CB090F30D27614CB4574010DA90DD862EF9D4EBEEL<<80)+\ 0x4761503190785A71C760L, "m":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\ (0xFFFFFFFFFF27E69532F48D89116FF22B8D4E0560609B4B38ABFAD2L<<80)+\ 0xB85DCACDB1411F10B275L, "q":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\ (0xFFFFFFFFFF27E69532F48D89116FF22B8D4E0560609B4B38ABFAD2L<<80)+\ 0xB85DCACDB1411F10B275L, "x":3, "y":(0x7503CFE87A836AE3A61B8816E25450E6CE5E1C93ACF1ABC1778064L<<296)+\ (0xFDCBEFA921DF1626BE4FD036E93D75E6A50E3A41E98028FE5FC235L<<80)+\ 0xF5B889A589CB5215F2A4L, "n":64 }, { "OID":"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB", "p":(0x800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000L<<296)+\ (0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000L<<80)+\ 0x0000000000000000006FL, "a":(0x800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000L<<296)+\ (0x000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000L<<80)+\ 0x0000000000000000006CL, "b":(0x687D1B459DC841457E3E06CF6F5E2517B97C7D614AF138BCBF85DCL<<296)+\ (0x806C4B289F3E965D2DB1416D217F8B276FAD1AB69C50F78BEE1FA3L<<80)+\ 0x106EFB8CCBC7C5140116L, "m":(0x800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000L<<296)+\ (0x000000000149A1EC142565A545ACFDB77BD9D40CFA8B996712101BL<<80)+\ 0xEA0EC6346C54374F25BDL, "q":(0x800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000L<<296)+\ (0x000000000149A1EC142565A545ACFDB77BD9D40CFA8B996712101BL<<80)+\ 0xEA0EC6346C54374F25BDL, "x":2, "y":(0x1A8F7EDA389B094C2C071E3647A8940F3C123B697578C213BE6DD9L<<296)+\ (0xE6C8EC7335DCB228FD1EDF4A39152CBCAAF8C0398828041055F94CL<<80)+\ 0xEEEC7E21340780FE41BDL, "n":64 }, { "OID":"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA", "p":0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFD97, "a":0xC2173F1513981673AF4892C23035A27CE25E2013BF95AA33B22C656F277E7335, "b":0x295F9BAE7428ED9CCC20E7C359A9D41A22FCCD9108E17BF7BA9337A6F8AE9513, "m":0x1000000000000000000000000000000003F63377F21ED98D70456BD55B0D8319C, "q":0x400000000000000000000000000000000FD8CDDFC87B6635C115AF556C360C67, "x":0x91E38443A5E82C0D880923425712B2BB658B9196932E02C78B2582FE742DAA28, "y":0x32879423AB1A0375895786C4BB46E9565FDE0B5344766740AF268ADB32322E5C, "n":32 }, { 'OID':"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC", "p":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\ (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<80)+\ 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDC7L, "a":(0xDC9203E514A721875485A529D2C722FB187BC8980EB866644DE41CL<<296)+\ (0x68E143064546E861C0E2C9EDD92ADE71F46FCF50FF2AD97F951FDAL<<80)+\ 0x9F2A2EB6546F39689BD3L, "b":(0xB4C4EE28CEBC6C2C8AC12952CF37F16AC7EFB6A9F69F4B57FFDA2EL<<296)+\ (0x4F0DE5ADE038CBC2FFF719D2C18DE0284B8BFEF3B52B8CC7A5F5BFL<<80)+\ 0x0A3C8D2319A5312557E1L, "m":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\ (0xFFFFFFFFFF26336E91941AAC0130CEA7FD451D40B323B6A79E9DA6L<<80)+\ 0x849A5188F3BD1FC08FB4L, "q":(0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\ (0xFFFFFFFFFFC98CDBA46506AB004C33A9FF5147502CC8EDA9E7A769L<<80)+\ 0xA12694623CEF47F023EDL, "x":(0xE2E31EDFC23DE7BDEBE241CE593EF5DE2295B7A9CBAEF021D385F7L<<296)+\ (0x074CEA043AA27272A7AE602BF2A7B9033DB9ED3610C6FB85487EAEL<<80)+\ 0x97AAC5BC7928C1950148L, "y":(0xF5CE40D95B5EB899ABBCCFF5911CB8577939804D6527378B8C108CL<<296)+\ (0x3D2090FF9BE18E2D33E3021ED2EF32D85822423B6304F726AA854BL<<80)+\ 0xAE07D0396E9A9ADDC40FL, "n" 0x8e20faa72ba0b470, 0x47107ddd9b505a38, 0xad08b0e0c3282d1c, 0xd8045870ef14980e, 0x6c022c38f90a4c07, 0x3601161cf205268d, 0x1b8e0b0e798c13c8, 0x83478b07b2468764, 0xa011d380818e8f40, 0x5086e740ce47c920, 0x2843fd2067adea10, 0x14aff010bdd87508, 0x0ad97808d06cb404, 0x05e23c0468365a02, 0x8c711e02341b2d01, 0x46b60f011a83988e, 0x90dab52a387ae76f, 0x486dd4151c3dfdb9, 0x24b86a840e90f0d2, 0x125c354207487869, 0x092e94218d243cba, 0x8a174a9ec8121e5d, 0x4585254f64090fa0, 0xaccc9ca9328a8950, 0x9d4df05d5f661451, 0xc0a878a0a1330aa6, 0x60543c50de970553, 0x302a1e286fc58ca7, 0x18150f14b9ec46dd, 0x0c84890ad27623e0, 0x0642ca05693b9f70, 0x0321658cba93c138, 0x86275df09ce8aaa8, 0x439da0784e745554, 0xafc0503c273aa42a, 0xd960281e9d1d5215, 0xe230140fc0802984, 0x71180a8960409a42, 0xb60c05ca30204d21, 0x5b068c651810a89e, 0x456c34887a3805b9, 0xac361a443d1c8cd2, 0x561b0d22900e4669, 0x2b838811480723ba, 0x9bcf4486248d9f5d, 0xc3e9224312c8c1a0, 0xeffa11af0964ee50, 0xf97d86d98a327728, 0xe4fa2054a80b329c, 0x727d102a548b194e, 0x39b008152acb8227, 0x9258048415eb419d, 0x492c024284fbaec0, 0xaa16012142f35760, 0x550b8e9e21f7a530, 0xa48b474f9ef5dc18, 0x70a6a56e2440598e, 0x3853dc371220a247, 0x1ca76e95091051ad, 0x0edd37c48a08a6d8, 0x07e095624504536c, 0x8d70c431ac02a736, 0xc83862965601dd1b, 0x641c314b2b8ee083 ] __Sbox = [ 0xFC, 0xEE, 0xDD, 0x11, 0xCF, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x16, 0xFB, 0xC4, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x23, 0xC5, 0x04, 0x4D, 0xE9, 0x77, 0xF0, 0xDB, 0x93, 0x2E, 0x99, 0xBA, 0x17, 0x36, 0xF1, 0xBB, 0x14, 0xCD, 0x5F, 0xC1, 0xF9, 0x18, 0x65, 0x5A, 0xE2, 0x5C, 0xEF, 0x21, 0x81, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x84, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xE3, 0x6A, 0x8F, 0xA0, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xED, 0x98, 0x7F, 0xD4, 0xD3, 0x1F, 0xEB, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xC8, 0x48, 0xAB, 0xF2, 0x2A, 0x68, 0xA2, 0xFD, 0x3A, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x0E, 0x56, 0x08, 0x0C, 0x76, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x72, 0x13, 0x47, 0x9C, 0xB7, 0x5D, 0x87, 0x15, 0xA1, 0x96, 0x29, 0x10, 0x7B, 0x9A, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x91, 0x78, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x9E, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x32, 0x75, 0x19, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0x35, 0x8A, 0x7E, 0x6D, 0x54, 0xC6, 0x80, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0x57, 0xDF, 0xF5, 0x24, 0xA9, 0x3E, 0xA8, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xD7, 0x79, 0xD6, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0x22, 0xB9, 0x03, 0xE0, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x94, 0xB0, 0xBC, 0xDC, 0xE8, 0x28, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x33, 0x0A, 0x4A, 0xA7, 0x97, 0x60, 0x73, 0x1E, 0x00, 0x62, 0x44, 0x1A, 0xB8, 0x38, 0x82, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x26, 0x41, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x46, 0x92, 0x27, 0x5E, 0x55, 0x2F, 0x8C, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x69, 0xD5, 0x95, 0x3B, 0x07, 0x58, 0xB3, 0x40, 0x86, 0xAC, 0x1D, 0xF7, 0x30, 0x37, 0x6B, 0xE4, 0x88, 0xD9, 0xE7, 0x89, 0xE1, 0x1B, 0x83, 0x49, 0x4C, 0x3F, 0xF8, 0xFE, 0x8D, 0x53, 0xAA, 0x90, 0xCA, 0xD8, 0x85, 0x61, 0x20, 0x71, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0x2B, 0x09, 0x5B, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x25, 0xD0, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x6C, 0x52, 0x59, 0xA6, 0x74, 0xD2, 0xE6, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xC0, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xAF, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x4B, 0x63, 0xB6 ] __Tau = [ 0, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56, 1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41, 49, 57, 2, 10, 18, 26, 34, 42, 50, 58, 3, 11, 19, 27, 35, 43, 51, 59, 4, 12, 20, 28, 36, 44, 52, 60, 5, 13, 21, 29, 37, 45, 53, 61, 6, 14, 22, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62, 7, 15, 23, 31, 39, 47, 55, 63 ] __C = [ [ 0xb1, 0x08, 0x5b, 0xda, 0x1e, 0xca, 0xda, 0xe9, 0xeb, 0xcb, 0x2f, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x65, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0x2f, 0x6a, 0x76, 0x43, 0x2e, 0x45, 0xd0, 0x16, 0x71, 0x4e, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x75, 0x85, 0xc4, 0xfc, 0x4b, 0x7c, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x92, 0x67, 0x69, 0x01, 0xa2, 0x42, 0x2a, 0x08, 0xa4, 0x60, 0xd3, 0x15, 0x05, 0x76, 0x74, 0x36, 0xcc, 0x74, 0x4d, 0x23, 0xdd, 0x80, 0x65, 0x59, 0xf2, 0xa6, 0x45, 0x07 ], [ 0x6f, 0xa3, 0xb5, 0x8a, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x2f, 0x1a, 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x9d, 0x46, 0x0f, 0x70, 0xb5, 0xd7, 0xf3, 0xfe, 0xea, 0x72, 0x0a, 0x23, 0x2b, 0x98, 0x61, 0xd5, 0x5e, 0x0f, 0x16, 0xb5, 0x01, 0x31, 0x9a, 0xb5, 0x17, 0x6b, 0x12, 0xd6, 0x99, 0x58, 0x5c, 0xb5, 0x61, 0xc2, 0xdb, 0x0a, 0xa7, 0xca, 0x55, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x1b, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0x56, 0xe6, 0x79, 0x04, 0x70, 0x21, 0xb1, 0x9b, 0xb7 ], [ 0xf5, 0x74, 0xdc, 0xac, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x0a, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x28, 0x6a, 0x3d, 0x84, 0x35, 0x06, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x52, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0x8b, 0xf2, 0xea, 0x75, 0x14, 0xb1, 0x29, 0x7b, 0x7b, 0xd3, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0xe4, 0x90, 0x35, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0xc1, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x37, 0x60, 0x62, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xc2, 0xb6, 0xf4, 0x43, 0x86, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0x31, 0x99, 0x1e, 0x96, 0xf5, 0x0a, 0xba, 0x0a, 0xb2 ], [ 0xef, 0x1f, 0xdf, 0xb3, 0xe8, 0x15, 0x66, 0xd2, 0xf9, 0x48, 0xe1, 0xa0, 0x5d, 0x71, 0xe4, 0xdd, 0x48, 0x8e, 0x85, 0x7e, 0x33, 0x5c, 0x3c, 0x7d, 0x9d, 0x72, 0x1c, 0xad, 0x68, 0x5e, 0x35, 0x3f, 0xa9, 0xd7, 0x2c, 0x82, 0xed, 0x03, 0xd6, 0x75, 0xd8, 0xb7, 0x13, 0x33, 0x93, 0x52, 0x03, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x53, 0xea, 0xa1, 0x93, 0xe8, 0x37, 0xf1, 0x22, 0x0c, 0xbe, 0xbc, 0x84, 0xe3, 0xd1, 0x2e ], [ 0x4b, 0xea, 0x6b, 0xac, 0xad, 0x47, 0x47, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x3f, 0x41, 0x0c, 0x6c, 0xa9, 0x23, 0x63, 0x7f, 0x15, 0x1c, 0x1f, 0x16, 0x86, 0x10, 0x4a, 0x35, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xd7, 0x80, 0x0f, 0xff, 0xbd, 0xbf, 0xcd, 0x17, 0x47, 0x25, 0x3a, 0xf5, 0xa3, 0xdf, 0xff, 0x00, 0xb7, 0x23, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x16, 0x7a, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0xea, 0x63, 0xf5, 0x60, 0x17, 0x58, 0xfd, 0x7c, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x57 ], [ 0xae, 0x4f, 0xae, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0xd3, 0xd9, 0x6f, 0xa4, 0xc3, 0x3b, 0x7a, 0x30, 0x39, 0xc0, 0x2d, 0x66, 0xc4, 0xf9, 0x51, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x6c, 0x18, 0x7f, 0x9a, 0xb4, 0x9a, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0xc6, 0xcf, 0xfa, 0xa6, 0xb7, 0x1c, 0x9a, 0xb7, 0xb4, 0x0a, 0xf2, 0x1f, 0x66, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xbf, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x72, 0x36, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x35, 0xfa, 0x68, 0x40, 0x7a, 0x46, 0x64, 0x7d, 0x6e ], [ 0xf4, 0xc7, 0x0e, 0x16, 0xee, 0xaa, 0xc5, 0xec, 0x51, 0xac, 0x86, 0xfe, 0xbf, 0x24, 0x09, 0x54, 0x39, 0x9e, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xe6, 0xbf, 0x87, 0xc9, 0xd3, 0x47, 0x3e, 0x33, 0x19, 0x7a, 0x93, 0xc9, 0x09, 0x92, 0xab, 0xc5, 0x2d, 0x82, 0x2c, 0x37, 0x06, 0x47, 0x69, 0x83, 0x28, 0x4a, 0x05, 0x04, 0x35, 0x17, 0x45, 0x4c, 0xa2, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xf3, 0x88, 0x86, 0x56, 0x4d, 0x3a, 0x14, 0xd4, 0x93 ], [ 0x9b, 0x1f, 0x5b, 0x42, 0x4d, 0x93, 0xc9, 0xa7, 0x03, 0xe7, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x41, 0x41, 0x4e, 0xb7, 0xf8, 0x71, 0x9c, 0x36, 0xde, 0x1e, 0x89, 0xb4, 0x44, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xdb, 0xc4, 0x9a, 0xf4, 0x89, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x92, 0x9b, 0x06, 0x90, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x8d, 0x2b, 0xd1, 0xa5, 0xc4, 0x2f, 0x36, 0xac, 0xc2, 0x35, 0x59, 0x51, 0xa8, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x02, 0xe7, 0x1e ], [ 0x37, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x54, 0x16, 0x31, 0x22, 0x9b, 0x94, 0x4c, 0x9a, 0xd8, 0xec, 0x16, 0x5f, 0xde, 0x3a, 0x7d, 0x3a, 0x1b, 0x25, 0x89, 0x42, 0x24, 0x3c, 0xd9, 0x55, 0xb7, 0xe0, 0x0d, 0x09, 0x84, 0x80, 0x0a, 0x44, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xb2, 0xce, 0xb1, 0x7b, 0x2b, 0x8a, 0x9a, 0xa6, 0x07, 0x9c, 0x54, 0x0e, 0x38, 0xdc, 0x92, 0xcb, 0x1f, 0x2a, 0x60, 0x72, 0x61, 0x44, 0x51, 0x83, 0x23, 0x5a, 0xdb ], [ 0xab, 0xbe, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x80, 0x05, 0x6f, 0x52, 0x38, 0x2a, 0xe5, 0x48, 0xb2, 0xe4, 0xf3, 0xf3, 0x89, 0x41, 0xe7, 0x1c, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x78, 0xdb, 0x1f, 0xff, 0xe1, 0x8a, 0x1b, 0x33, 0x61, 0x03, 0x9f, 0xe7, 0x67, 0x02, 0xaf, 0x69, 0x33, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x1e, 0x6c, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x76, 0x52, 0xf4, 0x36, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x3b, 0xb6, 0xc3, 0x74, 0xb4, 0xc7, 0xfb, 0x98, 0x45, 0x9c, 0xed ], [ 0x7b, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xc8, 0x89, 0xfb, 0x30, 0x02, 0xc6, 0xcd, 0x63, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x94, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0x6b, 0xbb, 0xeb, 0xab, 0x07, 0x61, 0x20, 0x01, 0x80, 0x21, 0x14, 0x84, 0x66, 0x79, 0x8a, 0x1d, 0x71, 0xef, 0xea, 0x48, 0xb9, 0xca, 0xef, 0xba, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0x47, 0x6e, 0x98, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x59, 0x4a, 0xc0, 0x6f, 0xd8, 0x5d, 0x6b, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xcd, 0x81, 0xf3, 0x2d, 0x1b ], [ 0x37, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x16, 0x31, 0xba, 0xd2, 0x13, 0x80, 0xb0, 0x04, 0x49, 0xb1, 0x7a, 0xcd, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x32, 0xbc, 0xdf, 0x1d, 0x77, 0xf8, 0x20, 0x12, 0xd4, 0x30, 0x21, 0x9f, 0x9b, 0x5d, 0x80, 0xef, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x91, 0xcc, 0x86, 0xe7, 0x1d, 0xa4, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xfa, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xd5, 0xd9, 0xb2, 0x1b, 0x99, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x92, 0x4a, 0xf1, 0x1b, 0xd7 
